Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands by Devanur, Nikhil R. et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
4.
05
02
7v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
7 A
pr
 20
17
Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands
Nikhil R. Devanur
Microsoft Research
Nima Haghpanah
Penn State University
Christos-Alexandros Psomas
UC Berkeley
Abstract
In the multi-unit pricing problem, multiple units of a single item are for sale. A buyer’s
valuation for n units of the item is vmin{n, d}, where the per unit valuation v and the capacity
d are private information of the buyer. We consider this problem in the Bayesian setting,
where the pair (v, d) is drawn jointly from a given probability distribution. In the unlimited
supply setting, the optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism is a pricing problem, i.e., it is
a menu of lotteries. In this paper we show that under a natural regularity condition on the
probability distributions, which we call decreasing marginal revenue, the optimal pricing is in
fact deterministic. It is a price curve, offering i units of the item for a price of pi, for every
integer i. Further, we show that the revenue as a function of the prices pi is a concave function,
which implies that the optimum price curve can be found in polynomial time. This gives a rare
example of a natural multi-parameter setting where we can show such a clean characterization
of the optimal mechanism. We also give a more detailed characterization of the optimal prices
for the case where there are only two possible demands.
1 Introduction
We study a pricing problem that is motivated by the following examples. A cloud computing
platform such as Amazon EC2 sells virtual machines to clients, each of who needs a different number
of virtual machine hours. Similarly, cloud storage providers such as Dropbox have customers
that require different amounts of storage. Software companies such as Microsoft sell software
subscriptions that can have different levels of service. The levels could be the number of different
documents you are allowed to create, or the number of hours you are allowed to use the software.
Companies like Google and Microsoft sell API calls to artificial intelligence software such as face
recognition, to other software developers. Video and mobile games are increasingly designed in
such a way that one can pay for better access to certain features. Spotify and iTunes sell music
subscription, and different people listen to different number of songs in a month. Cellphone service
providers like AT&T and Verizon offer cellular phone call minutes and data. People have widely
varying amounts of data consumption. Dating apps provide paid services where certain number of
messages sent by a client can be “promoted”.
Pricing is an important component in all these examples. The aim of this paper is to understand
how to price such goods, for a monopolist seller who aims to maximize her revenue. The following
common features (to a first degree of approximation) of these examples are crucial for our model.
• The marginal cost of offering a higher level of service is essentially a constant (and in many
cases zero). Most of the cost is a fixed cost.
• The valuations for the different levels of service are roughly linear, subject to a cap.
Based on this, we consider the following problem. There is a single good with multiple units of it
for sale. Equivalently, there is a single service with various levels of service. For ease of presentation
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we simply refer to ‘goods’ and ‘units’ from now on. The marginal cost to the seller for procuring
another unit of the good is a constant. There is a population of buyers, each of who has a linear
valuation for consuming a number of units of the good, subject to a cap (which we refer to as demand
henceforth). The type/private information of a buyer is determined by the per-unit valuation and
the demand. Buyers try to maximize their utility which is quasi linear, i.e., the valuation minus
their payment. The question is what is the revenue maximizing pricing scheme.
The standard approach in mechanism design [36] is Bayesian: assume that the types are drawn
from a given distribution and find/characterize the incentive compatible (IC) mechanism that
maximizes the expected revenue when the buyer types are drawn from this distribution. The
optimization is over randomized mechanisms, which in our case corresponds to pricing lotteries.
Here’s a simple example that shows that lotteries can obtain better revenue than any deterministic
pricing scheme. We represent the type of a buyer with a pair (v, d), where v is the per unit valuation
and d is the demand.
Example 1 (Deterministic pricing is not optimal). Suppose that there are 3 types of buyers, all
occurring with equal probability 13 . These types are t1 = (1, 3), t2 = (1, 2) and t3 = (6, 1). Consider
the lottery (which happens to be optimal for this case) that offers the following options:
1. 3 units at a price of 3, or
2. a lottery that gives 2 units at a price of 2 with probability 34 , and nothing otherwise.
Buyers of type t1 and t3 buy 3 units, where as buyers of type t2 buy the lottery, for a total expected
revenue of 7.53 . Consider the two deterministic prices that are in the support of the lottery. The
first one offers 3 units at a price of 3 and 2 units at a price of 2. In this case, a type t3 buyer
will switch to buying 2 units instead of 3 since her demand is only 1. Thus you get a revenue of 73 .
The 1/4 probability of not getting anything in the lottery makes the t3 buyer pay for 3 units. The
other price in the support of the lottery only offers 3 units at a price of 3. Buyers of type t1 and t3
buy this option whereas t2 will not buy anything, resulting in a revenue of
6
3 = 2. It can in fact be
argued that the revenue of 73 is optimal for deterministic prices.
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It appears that the optimal mechanism is usually randomized for small examples with discrete
support. This phenomenon is quite common. While Myerson [36] showed that the optimal mecha-
nism for single dimensional types is deterministic under quite a general assumption about the prior
distribution called regularity, even slight multi dimensional generalizations end up in randomized
mechanisms as optimal [41, 37, 26]. However, practical considerations force a seller to stick to
deterministic mechanisms for the most part. (This is true for all the applications listed above.)
Moreover, the optimal randomized mechanism sometimes doesn’t even have a finite description
[20]. Hence it is important to understand the structure of the optimal deterministic mechanism.
In this paper we offer two insights in this regard.
Out first contribution is to identify a natural condition that guarantees that the
optimal (randomized2) mechanism is deterministic. We call the condition we need as de-
creasing marginal revenue (DMR), in accordance with previous literature [19]. Regularity requires
1Any deterministic mechanism will have 3, possibly distinct, prices for each possible number of units. Consider
the price per unit for 2 units q2, and the price per unit for 3 units q3. If both q2 and q3 are strictly bigger than 1
then t1 and t2 will not buy; the revenue in this case is at most
6
3
= 2. If q3 ≤ 1 and q2 > 1, then t2 will not buy (the
price for one unit is larger than q2, so buying one unit is not an option); in this case the maximum price we could
charge for one unit is 3, and therefore the maximum revenue attainable is 6
3
= 2. If q3 ≤ 1 and q2 ≤ 1 setting them
equal to 1 only increases revenue, for a maximum of 7
3
. The last case (q3 > 1, q2 < 1) is infeasible.
2We use the convention that the optimal mechanism is always randomized. When we wish to restrict ourself to
deterministic mechanisms, we will use “optimal deterministic mechanism/pricing”.
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that the virtual value function is monotone, or equivalently, that the revenue function is concave in
the quantile space. DMR instead requires that in the value space, the marginal revenue is decreas-
ing or equivalently that revenue function is concave. In other words, a probability distribution with
CDF F is DMR, if the function v(1− F (v)), specifying the expected revenue of posting a price v,
is concave. The condition we need for the optimal pricing to be deterministic is that the marginal
distributions for v, conditioned on a given demand, are all DMR. We will provide a more detailed
analysis of the DMR condition below. We also give a detailed description of the optimal prices in
case there are only two distinct demands in the distribution. We note that the case of 2 distinct
levels of service is quite common (e.g., limited and premium).
Closely Related Work Malakhov and Vohra [33] consider the same problem (more generally
in the multiple bidder case), but made 2 strong assumptions: (1) that the buyers cannot report
a higher demand, and (2) that the distribution satisfies the following: the Myerson virtual value3
is monotone in both the value and the demand. This essentially results in the problem separating
out into a 1 dimensional problem, one for each d. The non-triviality in the 2 dimensional problem
comes because buyers can misreport their demands. The first assumption disallows reporting a
higher demand. The second assumption makes reporting a lower demand never profitable, without
having to do anything extra. When specialized to the case of a single buyer, it implies that a
deterministic pricing is optimal, since the same is true for the 1 dimensional case.
The recent work of Fiat et al. [22] solves the single buyer problem, with only the first assumption
above, that buyers cannot report a higher demand. This is a significant improvement, since the
second assumption above, which requires something quite strong about the correlation between
value and demand, is the more problematic one. Fiat et al. [22] consider what they call the
“FedEx” problem, which too has a 2 dimensional type space, where one of them is a value v, and
the other is a “deadline” d. The seller offers a service, such as delivering a package, at various
points of time, and the buyer’s valuation is v for any time that is earlier than her deadline d. In
their model, a higher d corresponds to an inferior product, as opposed to our model where higher
d is superior. The other difference is that in their model, all times earlier than d have the same
valuation and times later than d have a zero valuation, whereas in our model, the valuation stays
the same for higher ds but degrades gracefully as d decreases.
Despite these differences, the relevant IC constraints are syntactically identical. As was also
observed earlier by Malakhov and Vohra [33], without loss of generality, one can reduce the set
of IC constraints under consideration to only “local” constraints, such as the ones where a buyer
of type (v, d) reports (v, d − 1). This IC constraint is exactly the same for both our problem and
the FedEx problem. This is surprising because, as we observed above, what d − 1 means in both
cases is semantically different. (See Section 3 for an explanation.) On the other hand, a buyer
with deadline d can be made to never report a d′ > d, by making sure that she is always given the
service at her reported deadline. Thus, the FedEx problem is the same as our problem, with the
assumption that the buyers are not allowed to report a higher demand. Fiat et al. [22] characterize
the optimal mechanism, without any assumptions on the prior distribution.
Comparison. We do not make the assumption that the buyers cannot report higher demands.
Consider the case that there are just 2 different ds in the distribution, with d1 < d2, and the
question, when is it optimal to offer each level of service at the monopoly reserve price (say, r1
3 The Myerson virtual value given a distribution with CDF F and PDF f is φ(v) = v − 1−F (v)
f(v)
. In our case,
we define the virtual value of a type (v, d) by applying the same definition using the marginal distribution on v,
conditioned on d, and denoted by Fd and fd. φ(v, d) = v −
1−Fd(v)
fd(v)
.
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and r2 resp.) for the corresponding marginal distributions over values. The answer for the FedEx
problem is, when r1 ≥ r2, which just says that d1 should cost more than d2. In our case, the answer
is that r1 ≤ r2 and r1 ≥ d1d2 r2. Clearly d1 units should cost less, but not too low either, since
in that case some buyers with demand d2 will actually prefer d1 units. This points to the added
difficulty in our problem: we need to worry about a buyer opting for a bundle that could be of
any size, but in the FedEx problem a buyer would never consider later time slots. In addition, the
new IC constraints we need to consider are of the form where (v, d) reports ( dd+1v, d + 1). These
are “diagonal” IC constraints, as compared to the “vertical” ones in the FedEx problem, where a
buyer of type (v, d) reports (v, d − 1). These are harder to handle and the techniques used in the
FedEx problem, such as constructing an optimal dual, seem difficult to extend to this case.
The DMR Condition We are not the first to make this assumption: Che and Gale [19] made
the exact same assumption for a very similar problem, of selling a single item to a single buyer with
budget constraints, rather than demand or capacity constraints. The optimal mechanism there
could still be randomized. Fiat et al. [22] too show that the DMR condition is more natural than
the usual notion of regularity for their setting. In particular, they show that to derive the optimal
mechanism, one needs to iron4 in the value space, rather than the quantile space as usual. DMR is
precisely when no ironing is needed in the value space. As a result they too obtain that the optimal
mechanism is deterministic under DMR. The same assumption was also made by Kleinberg and
Leighton [29] in the context of dynamic pricing ; see Section 1.1 for more discussion on dynamic
pricing.
A simple class of DMR distributions is Uniform[a, b] for any non-negative reals a and b. More
generally, any distribution with finite support and monotone non-decreasing probability density is
DMR.5 Another standard class of demand distributions that satisfies DMR is a constant elastic-
ity distribution.6 (See Example 2 for the definition.) The DMR condition is different from the
regularity condition of Myerson [36], which requires that the function φ(v) = v − 1−F (v)f(v) is mono-
tone non-decreasing in v. The example below shows that DMR and regularity are incomparable
conditions.
Example 2 (DMR vs. regularity). Consider the class of constant elasticity distributions with
cumulative density F (v) = 1 − (v/a)1/ǫ for any for a ≥ 0 and ǫ < 0, supported on [a,∞). A
special case is when a = 1 and ǫ = −1, in which case F (v) = 1− 1/v, known as the equal revenue
distribution. The corresponding revenue function v(v/a)1/ǫ is concave if ǫ ≤ −1. However, the
function φ(v) = v− 1−F (v)f(v) simplifies to v(1+ǫ), which is monotone decreasing for ǫ < 1. Therefore
such a distribution is DMR, but not regular, for ǫ < −1. On the other hand, the exponential
distribution is regular but not DMR. Calculations for this example are straightforward and deferred
to Appendix A.
The class of DMR distributions is well-behaved in the sense that it is closed under convex
combinations. In particular, the distribution that results from drawing a sample from a DMR
distribution with probability α, and from another DMR distribution with probability 1 − α, is a
4Ironing is a technique introduced by [36] where the virtual value function is transformed so that it becomes
monotone. This corresponds to transforming the corresponding revenue function into a concave function.
5The second derivative of the revenue function is −2f(v)− vf ′(v), which is negative if f ′(v) ≥ 0.
6As the name suggests, the elasticity of demand for such a distribution is constant over the support. Such
distributions are commonly used in Industrial Organization since they can be easily estimated by measuring elasticity
anywhere on the support [43, 4].
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DMR distribution.7 On the other hand, it is known that regular distributions are not closed under
convex combinations [39].
We show that the DMR condition is necessary, by giving a distribution with monotone hazard
rate8, a condition stronger than regularity, for which a deterministic pricing is not optimal.
Example 3 (MHR distributions where deterministic pricing is not optimal). The marginal dis-
tributions of Example 1 for d = 1, 2 and 3 are point masses at 6, 1 and 1 respectively. Replace
them with normal distributions N (1− ǫ, σ), N (1− ǫ, σ) and N (6− ǫ, σ), truncated at 0 and V , for
some V > 6, and some ǫ > 0. Truncated normal distributions satisfy the monotone hazard rate
condition. For any δ > 0, we can choose σ and ǫ small enough, such that the revenue of the optimal
deterministic and randomized mechanisms from Example 1 changes by less than δ. Furthermore,
running these mechanisms on the new distributions yields essentially the same revenue.
Our Approach. Our approach is to show that any mechanism can be converted to a deterministic
one with higher revenue, which we perform in two steps. First, we convert a mechanism so that
a type with demand d and with highest valuation receives a deterministic allocation of d units,
without reducing revenue. In order to do so, we first argue that without loss of generality, any
type (v, d) is assigned a lottery over d units or no allocation (that is, there is no chance of receiving
d′ 6= d units). Then we show that the randomized allocation of highest values can be converted
to a deterministic allocation, without reducing revenue. Our first step holds generally and does
not require the DMR condition. Second, we argue that a mechanism resulting from the first step
can be converted to a deterministic mechanism. In particular, we remove all non-deterministic
allocations from the mechanism, and allow types to choose only among the remaining deterministic
allocations. Removal of allocations can only decrease (or keep fixed) the utility function of the
mechanism pointwise. However, since the highest type of each demand was assigned a deterministic
allocation, the utility of such a type remains unchanged. A technical lemma shows that under the
DMR condition, we can improve revenue by pointwise lowering utility whilst fixing the utility of
highest types.
1.1 Concavity of the revenue function
Our first result implies that the optimal pricing scheme is a price vector, which offers each number
of units for a given price. Our second contribution is to show that the revenue as a
function of the price vector is concave, under the same assumption of DMR. This implies
that the optimal prices can be found efficiently using the ellipsoid or other cutting plane methods
[28, 42, 31]. Note that DMR is a condition on the marginal distributions of values, and does not
immediately imply concavity as a function of the vector of prices. Note also that when we define
concavity, we consider a deterministic pricing scheme where the price vector is a convex combination
of two other deterministic prices, and not the corresponding lottery. This is best illustrated with
the same instance as in Example 1, which also shows that the revenue function need not always be
concave.
Example 4 (Revenue function is not concave). Consider the instance from Example 1, and the
convex combination of the two prices in the support of the lottery, using the same convex combi-
nation of (3/4, 1/4) as before. Recall that the first price vector is 3 units at price 3 and 2 units at
7The cumulative density of a distribution that samples from F1 with probability α, and from F2 otherwise, is
F (v) = αF1(v)+ (1−α)F2(v). Therefore, the revenue function of the convex combination is the convex combinations
of the revenue functions of F1 and F2, and is concave if F1 and F2 are DMR.
8The function 1−F (v)
f(v)
is monotone non-increasing
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price 2 for a revenue of 7, and the second is a price of 3 for either 2 or 3 units, for a revenue of 6.
The convex combination offers 3 units at a price of 3, and 2 units at a price of 9/4, with a revenue
of 6. The corresponding convex combination of the revenues is strictly larger than 6, and hence the
revenue function is not concave.
Techniques and Difficulties In order to show that the revenue function is concave, we first
give a closed form formula for the revenue function region-wise. We divide the price space into
different regions such that a region determines the order in which a buyer with a certain demand
actually ends up buying a lower sized bundle. For instance, a region might determine that for
all the buyers with demand 10, as their value decreases from ∞ down to 0, the bundle size they
actually buy goes from 10 to 7 to 3 to 0; the exact transition points of course depend on the prices.
We then show that the closed form formula for each of the regions is a concave function, implying
that the revenue is piecewise concave. This in general does not imply that the revenue function
is concave everywhere. One might surmise that the revenue function is the minimum of each of
these functions, which would show that it is concave everywhere, but that is unfortunately not
true. In fact, there is a partial order over these functions such that some of them are always higher
than the others. We show a somewhat surprising property, that at the boundaries of the regions
where they intersect, not only do the different functions agree (which they should, for the revenue
function to be even continuous), but also their gradients agree! Showing this involves arguing that
the equalities that hold at an intersection imply a whole set of other equalities such that disparate
terms in the two gradients cancel out.
Dynamic Pricing As a corollary, we obtain that under the DMR assumption, there is an efficient
dynamic pricing scheme, defined as follows. Consider a repeated setting where in each round
τ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, the seller posts a price vector pτ , a buyer is drawn from a fixed distribution,
and buys her utility maximizing bundle. The seller does not know the distribution of buyer types,
and has to only use the purchase information in previous rounds to set the price. The goal is to
approach the optimal revenue as T goes to infinity. Given that the distribution satisfies the DMR
assumption, our result on the concavity of the revenue curve implies that this is a special case of
the “convex bandits” problem [1, 8]. The results of Bubeck et al. [8] imply that there exists a
dynamic pricing scheme such that the average revenue per round converges to the optimal revenue
at the rate of n
9.5√
T
, where n is the number of units. These bounds are quite strong, since the best
known bounds for the dynamic pricing problem in general scale exponentially in n; the concavity
of the revenue function is an assumption often made to escape this curse of dimensionality [5, 40].
We show that this assumption can be weakened to an assumption about the concavity of only the
1 dimensional revenue functions for each d. The same assumption was made by Kleinberg and
Leighton [29] to get a 1/
√
T regret for the case of a single item.
1.2 Other Related work
The seminal work of Myerson [36] settled the optimal mechanism design problem for selling to
multiple buyers with single parameter type spaces. Since then, it has been discovered that multi-
dimensional type spaces are a lot more difficult to analyze, and this remains to this day the foremost
challenge in mechanism design. The optimal mechanism becomes randomized for even slight gen-
eralizations [41, 37, 26]. Following Myerson [36], some early work solved very special cases of this
[30, 35]. Manelli and Vincent [34] showed conditions under which bundling all the items was opti-
mal when there were either 2 or 3 heterogeneous items. Success with reasonably general settings
had been limited.
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There has been a recent spate of results in the algorithmic game theory community characteriz-
ing optimal mechanisms for special cases, and all of these consider a single buyer. Daskalakis et al.
[20] use optimal transport theory to give sufficient conditions of optimality for an additive buyer
with independent item valuations: when “selling only the grand bundle” is optimal and examples
where a continuum of lotteries is the unique optimal mechanism. Giannakopoulos and Koutsou-
pias [23] identify a (deterministic) optimal auction for an additive buyer whose valuations are i.i.d.
from U [0, 1], for up to 6 items. Haghpanah and Hartline [24] identify conditions under which either
“selling only the favorite item” for a unit-demand buyer or selling only the grand bundle for an
additive buyer is optimal. Daskalakis et al. [21] identify necessary and sufficient conditions for
selling only the grand bundle to be optimal for an additive buyer. The FedEx problem [22] that
we described earlier also falls in this line of work. Our paper contributes to this line of work by
identifying a reasonably general setting where the optimal mechanism is in fact deterministic, and
can be computed efficiently. All these results use linear or convex program duality, to construct
a witness (dual optimal solution) of optimality. We also frame our problem as a mathematical
program, but argue about the primal directly, which we find gives more intuition.9
The lack of characterizations of optimal mechanisms in general settings has been addressed
by seeking computational results instead. (We refer the reader to Hartline [27] for a thorough
overview of this line of work.) A sequence of papers by Cai et al. [10, 11, 12, 13] showed that for
finite (multi-dimensional) type spaces, the mechanism design problem can be reduced to a related
algorithm design problem, thus essentially resolving the computational question for this case. Most
of these assume a finite support and the computation time is polynomial in the size of the support.
This is different from our model which assumes a continuous distribution.
Yet another approach to cope with the complexity of optimal mechanisms has been to show that
simple auctions approximate optimal ones. In this line of work, two classes of valuations have been
widely studied, unit demand valuations [16, 6, 17, 18, 2], and additive valuations [25, 32, 3, 44].
A unified approach to both has been presented in Cai et al. [14], and these approaches have been
extended to more general valuations in Rubinstein and Weinberg [38], Chawla and Miller [15], Cai
and Zhao [9]. Most of these make some sort of assumption about independence of values for different
items. Our model differs in this aspect: either we see it as a special case of a unit demand problem
(each buyer wants one of several bundles) in which case the values are highly correlated, or as a
problem with 2 dimensional type space (v, d), and we allow arbitrary correlations between the v
and d. Also, the goal in our paper is a characterization of the optimal mechanism as opposed to
identifying simple but approximately optimal mechanisms.
2 Model and Main Results
We consider a multi-unit mechanism with a single buyer with private demand. In a multi-unit
mechanism, there are infinitely many units of a single item for sale. The type t of a buyer is
specified by her per unit value v ∈ R+ and her demand d ∈ Z+. The valuation of such a buyer
for m ∈ Z+ units of the item is v ∗min {m,d}. Both v and d are private information of the buyer,
making this a multi-parameter setting.
We restrict our attention to direct revelation mechanisms, which ask the buyer to report her
type t = (v, d). The mechanism is allowed to be randomized, so the output is an allocation A ∈ Z+
and a payment P ∈ R+, both of which are random variables (and functions of the reported type
(v, d)).
9We did try to construct the optimal duals explicitly, but were not able to construct such duals in general.
Constructing such duals is likely to facilitate characterizing the optimal mechanism for all distributions.
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We require the mechanism to be incentive compatible, in expectation over the randomization
of the mechanism. Formally, a mechanism is said to be EIC if for all valid types (v, d) and (v′, d′),
the utility of the type (v, d) from reporting its type truthfully is at least the utility it would get
from reporting type (v′, d′),
E [v (min {A(v, d), d} −min {A(v′, d′), d})− P (v, d) + P (v′, d′)] ≥ 0,
where the expectation is taken over the randomization of the mechanism. We assume that (0, 0) is a
always a valid type declaration, so this includes as a special case, an expected individual rationality
(EIR) condition, which requires that each type must get a non-negative utility from reporting its
type truthfully
E [vmin {A(v, d), d} − P (v, d)] ≥ 0.
By linearity of expectation, we may assume w.l.o.g. that the payment is deterministic, and we
denote this deterministic payment by p(t). A stronger notion of individual rationality is ex-post
individual rationality, which requires that the utility of a type is positive for any randomization of
the mechanism. However, in the lemma below we show that any EIR mechanism can be converted
to an ex-post individually rational mechanism which guarantees positive for any randomization of
the mechanism. The argument is standard and is deferred. As a result of the lemma, we will only
focus on the EIR constraint in what follows. (All the missing proofs in the rest of the paper are in
Appendix A.)
Lemma 1. For every EIC and EIR mechanism, there exists an EIC and ex-post IR mechanism
with the same expected payment for any type.
When there are no supply constraints that bind across buyers, or equivalently there is a single
buyer, an alternate interpretation of such a mechanism is as a menu of lotteries. A lottery is a pair
of a probability distribution over Z+ and a price, corresponding to the randomized allocation and
payment. The buyer chooses the lottery that maximizes her expected utility from among a menu.
In general this menu could be of infinite size. We call this the multi-unit pricing problem.
Consider a distribution over the type space, with a density function f . The Bayesian optimal
mechanism w.r.t. this distribution is the EIC (and EIR) mechanism that maximizes the expected
revenue when the types are drawn from this distribution:
Et∼f [p(t)] .
Our goal is to characterize the Bayesian optimal mechanism. We make two assumptions:
• The support of the distribution in the demand dimension is finite. We denote by k the size
of this support. In other words, there are k different demands possible.
• Let fd and Fd denote the PDF and the CDF of the marginal distribution on values conditioned
on the demand being d. Then v(1 − Fd(v)) is concave in v for any given d. We call this
property decreasing marginal revenue (DMR). This is equivalent to the fact that vfd(v) −
1− Fd(v) is a non-decreasing function of v. This is closely related to the usual definition of
regularity, which requires monotonicity of this function divided by f(v).
We now state our first main theorem. The Bayesian optimal multi-unit pricing with linear
valuations, private demands, finitely many demands and DMR distributions is deterministic. A
deterministic mechanism is simply a menu with a deterministic allocation of each possible bundle
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of d units, for d in the support of f . Let d1 < d2 < · · · < dk be the demands in this support.
We denote the prices for the corresponding bundles by p1, p2, . . . , pk. A buyer can get di units by
paying pi for any i ∈ [k]. A buyer with type t = (v, d) chooses to buy the bundle that maximizes
her utility vmin{d, di}− pi. Let p denote the vector of unit prices (p1, . . . , pk). We assume without
loss of generality that the domain of p is such that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pk. We denote by Rev(p)
the (expected) revenue of this mechanism. Our second main theorem is Theorem 2. Due to this
theorem, the optimal mechanism can be found efficiently, since maximizing a concave function can
be done in polynomial time. Rev(p) is a concave function if the marginal distributions are DMR
for all d.
Dynamic pricing Consider the following online problem. In each round τ ∈ 1, 2, . . . , T , for some
T ∈ Z+, the following takes place.
1. The seller posts a price vector pτ .
2. A buyer of type (vτ , dτ ) is drawn independently from the distribution f .
3. The buyer buys her utility maximizing bundle xτ ∈ argmax{i:di≤dτ} vτdi − pτi .
4. The seller observes only xτ .
Assume, for the sake of notational convenience, that d0 = 0 and p
τ
0 = 0 for all τ , so x
τ = 0 when
the buyer doesn’t buy anything. The goal of the seller is to maximize her average (or equivalently,
total) revenue
1
T
T∑
τ=1
pτxτ .
We evaluate the performance of a dynamic pricing scheme by its regret, which is the difference
between the optimal expected revenue and the average expected revenue of the pricing scheme. We
assume that the values are bounded, and that vmax is the maximum value. The results of Bubeck
et al. [8], Bubeck [7] imply the following as a corollary of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. There is a dynamic pricing scheme where the regret is
O˜(n9.5)dkvmax√
T
.
3 Deterministic mechanisms are optimal
In this section we prove our first main theorem. Throughout this section, we assume, for the sake
of convenience, that the support of the distribution in the value space is ⊆ [0, V¯ ].
The Bayesian optimal multi-unit pricing with linear valuations, private demands, finitely many
demands and DMR distributions is deterministic.
Allocating only the demanded: We first use a reduction that might actually introduce ran-
domization: w.l.o.g. we may assume that A(v, d) is supported on {0, d}. A buyer who reports a
demand of d is either allocated exactly d units or none at all. The reduction replaces any alloca-
tion of d′ < d units with an allocation of d units with probability d′/d while retaining the same
payment, and argues that this does not violate any EIC constraints. This may seem to go counter
to our eventual conclusion that deterministic pricing is optimal; there are easy examples where a
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deterministic optimal pricing allocates d′ < d units. Nonetheless, what we will show in the end
is that the allocation probabilities for a buyer with demand d should be exactly equal to d′/d for
some other (lower) demand d′. We can then reduce in the other direction: this is equivalent to
deterministically allocating d′ units.
Lemma 2. For every feasible Bayesian mechanism, there exists another mechanism, with revenue
at least as large, such that A(v, d) is supported on {0, d}.
Let ti = (vi, di) and tj = (vj, dj) be any two types. We write u (vi, di → vj, dj), or just
u (ti → tj), for the utility of an agent with type ti when she reports type tj. From now on, we
assume that the mechanism allocates di units to ti, with some probability w (ti), and for some price
p(ti). Using this, u (ti → tj) can be re written as vimin (di, dj)w (tj)− p(tj). We write wd for the
allocation probability as a function of v when the reported demand is d.
Local IC constraints are sufficient: We now show that it is sufficient to consider a subset
of IC constraints; the others are implied by these. The first set of constraints are “horizontal”
constraints, where you fix d and only change v. Further, the horizontal constraints can be replaced
by monotonicity and a payment identity a` la Myerson:
p (v, d) = vdwd(v)− d
∫ v
0 wd (z) dz + p (0, d) .
We now argue that in the optimal mechanism we must have p (0, d) = 0 for all d. Incentive
compatibility requires that p (0, d) = p (0, d′) for all d, d′, since otherwise the type with higher
payment would prefer to report being the other type and pay less (such a type gets no utility from
allocation). The next step is to show that an mechanism where p (0, ·) < 0 cannot be optimal. To
see this, construct another mechanism which adds p (0, ·) to the payment of all types. The new
mechanism respects all the EIC and EIR constraints (utility of type (0, d) is zero for all d), and has
higher revenue. As a result, the payments identity simplifies to:
p (v, d) = vdwd(v)− d
∫ v
0 wd (z) dz. (1)
In addition to the local horizontal constraints consider above, there are the local “vertical” con-
straints, which are of two types; a type with demand di reports di+1 or di−1. In either case,
we only need to consider a particular misreport of the value v′, and this value is such that
u (v, d→ v′, d′) = u (v′, d′ → v′, d′). The following lemma characterizes such v′, which can be
verified by an easy calculation.
Lemma 3. u
(
v, di → v didj , dj
)
= u
(
v didj , dj → v
di
dj
, dj
)
for j > i, and
u (v, di → v, dj) = u (v, dj → v, dj) for j < i.
The next lemma formalizes our discussion above on sufficiency of local EIC constraints. The
first condition of the lemma is the local horizontal constraint, and the next two are local vertical
constraints. The lemma follows by showing that the EIC constraint where (v, d) misreports (v′, d′)
is implied by a sequence of EIC constraints, where you iteratively use the vertical constraints to
change the report of d by ±1 until you get to d′, and then use the horizontal constraint to change
the report to v′. A mechanism satisfying the following conditions is EIC: ∀di and ∀v,
1. wdi is monotone non-decreasing, and p(v, di) is given by Equation (1).
2. u (v, di+1 → v, di+1) ≥ u (v, di+1 → v, di)
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3. u (v, di → v, di) ≥ u
(
v, di → v didi+1 , di+1
)
It is interesting to compare this global-to-local reduction with that used in the FedEx problem.
Syntactically, for the the FedEx problem just the first 2 constraints above are sufficient, but the
semantics are different. In the FedEx problem the d’s are the deadlines, and a larger d signifies an
inferior product, whereas in our problem a larger d is a superior product. That the EIC constraints
still look the same for misreporting a lower d is due to the other difference between the problems:
utility scales linearly with d in our problem, but remains constant in the FedEx problem. Thus in
both problems, the valuation for an item of type d′ < d is the same for types (v, d) and (v, d′).
Mathematical Program for the optimal mechanism: We now write a mathematical pro-
gram that captures the optimal mechanism. It will turn out to be convenient to use the fol-
lowing as variables of the program. Let Udi(v) :=
∫ v
0 wdi (z) dz. Notice that diUdi(v) is just
the utility of a type (v, di) when reporting the truth. Our objective is to maximize revenue, i.e.∑D
di=1
∫ V¯
0 p (v, di) f(v, di)dv. Let φd(v) := v− 1−Fd(v)fd(v) be the standard Myerson virtual value func-
tion. Using the payment identity (1) and integration by parts a` la Myerson, we can rewrite this
objective in terms of the Udi(v) variables as:
Rev =
k∑
di=1
∫ V¯
0
wdi (v)φdi(v)fdi(v)dv =
k∑
di=1
∫ V¯
0
U ′di(v)φdi(v)fdi(v)dv
=
k∑
di=1
Udi
(
V¯
)
φdi(V¯ )fdi(V¯ )−
∫ V¯
0
Udi(v) (φdi(v)fdi(v))
′ dv. (2)
Using this, and Theorem 3, we can restate the Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem
as the following program. We define U ′d to be the left derivative of Ud, which will be convenient
to think of as wd, the probability of allocation. Note that since the distribution over types is
continuous, whether we allocate or not to any particular type (v, d) does not affect revenue. The
first constraint is equivalent to saying that the allocation is monotone non decreasing, and the
second constraint says that the allocation probability is between 0 and 1.
max
∑k
i=1 Udi
(
V¯
)
φdi(V¯ )fdi(V¯ )−
∫ V¯
0 Udi(v) (φdi(v)fdi(v))
′ dv
subject to :
Udi(v) is concave ∀i ∈ [k]
1 ≥ U ′di(v) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [k],∀v (3)
Udi(0) = 0 ∀i ∈ [k]
diUdi(v) ≥ di+1Udi+1
(
v didi+1
)
∀i ∈ [k − 1]
di+1Udi+1(v) ≥ diUdi (v) ∀i ∈ [k − 1]
To prove our main result, we utilize the the DMR property through the following Lemma. The
Lemma allows us to compare the revenue of mechanisms by pointwise comparing their induced
utility functions. In particular, the Lemma states that by lowering the utilities of all types while
keeping the utility of types with the highest value fixed, we can improve the revenue of a mechanism.
Lemma 4. Consider two feasible mechanisms with utility functions U and U¯ , such that Ud(v) ≤
U¯d(v) for all types, and Ud(V¯ ) = U¯d(V¯ ) for all d. If the marginal distributions Fd are DMR for all
d, then the revenue of the mechanism with utility function U¯ is at least as high as the revenue of
the mechanism with utility function U .
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Proof. The proof follows directly from the expression of revenue in equation (2). Since Ud(V¯ ) =
U¯d(V¯ ), for all i we have
Udi
(
V¯
)
φdi(V¯ )fdi(V¯ ) = U¯di
(
V¯
)
φdi(V¯ )fdi(V¯ ). (4)
In addition, φd(v)fd(v) = vfd(v)−(1−Fd(v)) = − ddv (v(1−Fd(v))). The assumption that v(1−Fd(v))
is concave implies that ddv (v(1−Fd(v))) is monotone non-increasing, which implies that φd(v)fd(v)
is monotone non-decreasing, or equivalently (φd(v)fd(v))
′ ≥ 0. The assumption that Ud(v) ≤ U¯d(v)
then implies that
−
∫ V¯
0
Udi(v) (φdi(v)fdi(v))
′ dv ≤ −
∫ V¯
0
U¯di(v) (φdi(v)fdi(v))
′ dv. (5)
By equation (2), the revenue of the mechanism with utility function U is
∑k
di=1
Udi
(
V¯
)
φdi(V¯ )fdi(V¯ )−
∫ V¯
0 Udi(v) (φdi(v)fdi(v))
′ d
≤∑kdi=1 U¯di
(
V¯
)
φdi(V¯ )fdi(V¯ )−
∫ V¯
0 U¯di(v) (φdi(v)fdi(v))
′ dv,
which is equal to the revenue of the mechanism with utility function U¯ .
Having set the problem up, we now turn to the proof of the main theorem, Lemma 2, that a
deterministic mechanism is the optimal solution to the above revenue maximization program. The
main component is the Lemma below, which shows that for any feasible solution to the problem,
there exists a deterministic solution with revenue at least as large.
Lemma 5. Consider any feasible solution to mathematical program (3). If the marginal distribu-
tions Fd are DMR for all d, then there exists a deterministic mechanism with revenue at least as
large.
The Lemma follows immediately from the following two Lemmas.
The first Lemma states that we can improve the revenue of any mechanism by assigning any
type (V¯ , d) a deterministic allocation of d units. In particular, we show that by setting the price
for the deterministic allocation of d units appropriately, we can ensure that the type (V¯ , d) would
be willing to choose the deterministic allocation, while no other type would have the incentive to
misreport and get that allocation. The intuition is that a type (V¯ , d) has, among all other types, the
highest value per unit for a deterministic allocation of d units. By setting the price of the allocation
in a way that (V¯ , d) is indifferent, no other type would be willing to take the new allocation. In
addition, since (V¯ , d) is indifferent between the deterministic allocation of d units and its previous
allocation, and since it has higher value for d units, its payment for d units has only increased.
Note that the Lemma below does not require the DMR condition.
Lemma 6. Consider any feasible solution to the mathematical program (3). There exists a mech-
anism, with revenue at least as large, where any type with highest value (V¯ , d) deterministically
receives d units.
Proof. Fix any feasible mechanism (w, p). Construct a mechanism (w¯, p¯) as follows. For each
demand d, define w¯d(V¯ ) = 1 and p¯d(V¯ ) = V¯ d − Ud(V¯ ). All other types (v, d) with v < V¯ are
assigned the same allocation and payment as in the original mechanism.
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We first argue that any type obtains the same utility from reporting truthfully in both mecha-
nisms, that is
Ud(v) = U¯d(v). (6)
For any type (v, d) where v < V¯ , the allocation and the payment remains the same. Any type
(V¯ , d) satisfies U¯d(V¯ ) = V¯ d− (V¯ d−Ud(V¯ )) = Ud(V¯ ). Since the original mechanism is individually
rational, so will be the new mechanism given Ud(v) = U¯d(v).
Further, notice that the revenue of the mechanism (w¯, p¯) is no lower than the revenue of (w, p).
In fact, we have p¯d(V¯ ) = V¯ d− Ud(V¯ ) = V¯ d− (V¯ dwd(V¯ )− pd(V¯ )) ≥ pd(V¯ ), while payments of all
other types remain the same.
We next argue that the mechanism (w¯, p¯) is incentive compatible. We only need to show that
a type (v, d) has no incentive to misreport to (V¯ , d′). The utility from misreporting is
u¯(v, d→ V¯ , d′) = vmin(d, d′)− p¯d′(V¯ )
= vmin(d, d′)− (V¯ d′ − Ud′(V¯ ))
= vmin(d, d′)− (V¯ d′ − (V¯ d′wd′(V¯ )− pd′(V¯ )))
= vmin(d, d′)− V¯ d′(1− wd′(V¯ ))− pd′(V¯ ).
Since 1− wd′(V¯ ) ≥ 0, we conclude that
u¯(v, d→ V¯ , d′) ≤ vmin(d, d′)− vmin(d, d′)(1 −wd′(V¯ ))− pd′(V¯ )
= vmin(d, d′)wd′(V¯ )− pd′(V¯ ).
The above expression is the utility that type (v, d) would obtain from misreporting type (V¯ , d′)
in the original mechanism. By incentive compatibility of (w, p), the above expression is at most
u(v, d→ v, d). Therefore, we conclude that
u¯(v, d→ V¯ , d′) ≤ u(v, d→ v, d) = Ud(v) = U¯d(v),
where the last equation is the same as equation (6), and was established above. Thus the mechanism
is incentive compatible, and the Lemma follows.
The next Lemma builds on Lemma 6 and shows that for any mechanism where any type (V¯ , d)
deterministically receives d units, there exists a deterministic mechanism with revenue at least as
large. The intuition is that by removing all non-deterministic allocations from the mechanism,
the utility of every type would weakly decrease, while the utility of a type (V¯ , d) stays the same.
Lemma 4 can then be used to argue that the revenue of a deterministic mechanism is weakly higher.
Lemma 7. Consider any mechanism where any type with highest value (V¯ , d) deterministically
receives d units. If the marginal distributions Fd are DMR for all d, then there exists a deterministic
mechanism with revenue at least as large.
Proof. Fix any type with highest value (V¯ , d) that deterministically receives d units. Consider the
menu representation of the mechanism: it offers, among other lotteries, deterministic allocations of
d units, for all d. Now construct an alternative menu that only offers such deterministic allocations.
The alternative menu contains k choices of deterministic allocations of d1 to dk units. Note that the
utility function of the alternative mechanism is pointwise (weakly) smaller than the utility function
of the original mechanism, since each type faces a smaller menu of choices. Furthermore, the utility
of type (V¯ , d) remains the same for all d, since the deterministic allocations that they chose in the
original mechanism are still available in the alternative mechanism. By Lemma 4, the revenue of
the alternative mechanism is no lower than the revenue of the original mechanism.
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We are now ready to complete the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider any feasible solution to the problem. By Lemma 5, the revenue of
the mechanism is at most the revenue of the optimal deterministic mechanism. Since the optimal
deterministic mechanism exists and is a feasible to the problem, it must also be the optimal solution
to the problem 3.
4 Concavity of the revenue function
In this section we prove Theorem 2. Recall that the demands in the support of the distribution are
d1 < d2 < · · · < dk, and that for all i ∈ [k], pi denotes the price for the bundle of di units, and p
denotes the vector of all pis. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the domain of p is
0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pk.
With this, we may assume that a buyer with demand di only buys a bundle dj for j ≤ i. We restate
Theorem 2 for convenience. Rev(p) is a concave function if the marginal distributions are DMR
for all d.
Characterizing optimal bundles: The revenue is determined by what the optimal bundle for
each type is, given a price p. To analyze this, we first consider when a given type prefers a bundle
of dj units to one of dl units, for j 6= l ∈ [k]. The following quantity turns out to be the threshold
at which the preference changes.
∀j, l ∈ [k] : j > l, Dj,l △= pj − pl
dj − dl .
For convenience, we also define Dj,0
△
= pj/dj for all j ∈ [k].
Lemma 8. For all i ≥ j > l ∈ [k], a buyer of type (v, di) prefers a bundle of dj units to a bundle
of dl units if and only if v > Dj,l. Both bundles are equally preferable precisely when v = Dj,l.
Proof. The buyer prefers dj units over dl units if and only if vdj − pj > vdl − pl. Rearranging, we
get the lemma.
Before we proceed further, we note the following property for future reference.
Lemma 9. For all i ≥ j ≥ l ∈ [k], Di,l is a convex combination of (and hence is always in between)
Di,j and Dj,l.
Proof. It is easy to check the following identity. Di,l =
1
di−dl ((di − dj)Di,j + (dj − dl)Dj,l) .
We next consider how the optimum bundle changes for a given di, as v decreases from V¯ to
0. For high enough v, the optimum bundle for type (v, di) should be di units. As v decreases, the
optimal bundle is going to switch at the threshold maxj<i{Di,j} (to something in the argmax).
Similarly, as v decreases further, the optimal bundle is going to switch again and so on. In fact,
these sequences for different dis are not independent and we can capture each such sequence of
optimum bundles by a single vector σ ∈ Zk such that the ith co-ordinate σ(i) ∈ argmaxj<i{Di,j}.
Given such a σ, for each i, the sequence of optimal bundles for types with demand di is given by
the directed path Pσ(i), defined as the (unique) longest path starting from i in the directed graph
on [k] with edges (i, σ(i)). (The path ends when σ(i) = 0 for some i.)
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In fact, there is a closed form formula for the revenue function provided we know what the
resulting σ is. Towards this, it is going to be more useful to consider the inverse of this map from
p to σ: given any σ ∈ Zk such that σ(i) ∈ [i − 1], we define ∆σ to be all the prices where the
sequence of optimal bundles as described above is given by Pσ(i). Formally,
∆σ
△
=
{
p : ∀i, σ(i) ∈ argmax
j<i
{Di,j}
}
.
Revenue function formula: We are now ready to give a closed form formula for the revenue
function within each ∆σ. For ease of notation we let Fi denote the conditional CDF Fdi , and let
qi to denote the probability that the buyer has a demand di. We also use σ
2(i) to denote σ(σ(i)).
We now define the following revenue function corresponding to σ which captures Rev(p) in ∆σ:
Revσ(p)
△
=
∑
i qi
(
pi
(
1− Fi(Di,σ(i))
)
+
∑
j∈Pσ(i) pσ(j)
(
Fi(Dj,σ(j))− Fi(Dσ(j),σ2(j))
))
,
Lemma 10. Rev(p) = Revσ(p) for all p ∈ ∆σ.
Proof. Suppose p ∈ ∆σ. Consider all buyer types with demand di. Among these, all types with
value v > Di,σ(i) prefer to buy the bundle of di units over any other bundle, by Lemma 8, and
because p ∈ ∆σ. These contribute qipi
(
1− Fi(Di,σ(i))
)
to the revenue.
Now consider all types with value v ∈ [Dj,σ(j),Dσ(j),σ2(j)] for some j ∈ Pσ(i). We need to
prove that these prefer a bundle of dσ(j) over any other bundle dl, so that they contribute to the
revenue exactly qipσ(j)
(
Fi(Dj,σ(j))− Fi(Dσ(j),σ2(j))
)
, and the lemma follows. As characterized by
Lemma 8, this follows from the following.
• If l < σ(j), then v ≥ Dσ(j),σ2(j) ≥ Dσ(j),l. This holds because p ∈ ∆σ.
• If i ≥ l > σ(j), then v ≤ Dj,σ(j) ≤ Dl,σ(j). We prove this in the rest of the proof.
We first prove that ∀j ∈ Pσ(i), Dj,σ(j) ≥ Dσ(j),σ2(j). This follows from the fact that Dj,σ2(j)
is in between Dj,σ(j) and Dσ(j),σ2(j) (Lemma 9), and that Dj,σ2(j) ≤ Dj,σ(j) (since p ∈ ∆σ). We
now prove the following: ∀j ∈ Pσ(i), and l ∈ (σ(j), j], we have that Dl,σ(j) ≥ Dj,σ(j). This follows
from the fact that if l ∈ (σ(j), j], then Dj,σ(j) is in between Dj,l and Dl,σ(j) (from Lemma 9), and
Dj,l ≤ Dj,σ(j). Now by a repeated application of the fact Dj,σ(j) ≥ Dσ(j),σ2(j), we get the same
conclusion for all j and l such that i ≥ l > σ(j).
Concavity of Revσ: We next show that each of the Revσs by itself is a concave function. We do
this by showing that Revσ can be written as a positive linear combination of linear functions, and
compositions of the functions v(1−Fd(v)) with linear functions. Since the v(1−Fd(v)) functions are
concave by assumption, and such compositions and positive linear combinations preserve concavity,
Revσ is concave too.
Lemma 11. For all σ, Revσ(p) is a concave function.
Proof. We can rewrite Revσ as follows, using the definition of Dj,l.
Revσ =
∑
i qi
(
pi −
∑
j∈Pσ(i) Fi(Dj,σ(j))
(
pj − pσ(j)
))
=
∑
i qi
(
pi −
∑
j∈Pσ(i) Fi(Dj,σ(j))Dj,σ(j) (j − σ(j))
)
.
We assumed that v(1−Fi(v)) is concave, which implies that −vFi(v) is concave. Dj,σ(j) is a linear
function of p for all j. Since composition of linear functions with concave functions is concave, it
follows that −Fi(Dj,σ(j))Dj,σ(j) is concave. Now Revσ is a positive linear combination of concave
functions, which makes it concave too.
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Stitching the Revσs together: Lemmas 10 and 11 imply that Rev is piecewise concave, i.e.,
inside each ∆σ it is concave. In general this does not imply that such a function is concave
everywhere. One property that would imply that Rev is concave everywhere would be if Rev was
equal to minσ Revσ. Unfortunately, this is not true. In fact, there is a partial order over σs that
determine when one Revσ is always greater than the other. We show a different, and somewhat
surprising, property of the Revσs that also implies that Rev is concave. We show that at the
boundaries between two regions not only do the corresponding Revσs agree (which they should, for
Rev to be even continuous), but also their gradients agree!
Lemma 12. For all σ, σ′, p such that p ∈ ∆σ ∩∆σ′ , we have that
Revσ(p) = Revσ′(p) and ∇Revσ(p) = ∇Revσ′(p).
Proof. We first argue that it is sufficient to prove Lemma 12 for the case where σ and σ′ disagree
in exactly one co-ordinate, i.e., there is some i∗ such that σ(i∗) 6= σ′(i∗), and ∀j 6= i∗, σ(j) = σ′(j).
Suppose we have done that. Now consider any two σ and σ′, and a sequence σ = σ1, σ2, . . . , σn = σ′
such that for any i, σi and σi+1 differ in exactly one co-ordinate, where σi agrees with σ in that co-
ordinate and σi+1 agrees with σ
′. The fact that p ∈ ∆σ∩∆σ′ implies that for all co-ordinates j such
that σ(j) 6= σ′(j), both σ(j) and σ′(j) ∈ argmaxj′<j{Dj,j′}. Similarly, p ∈ ∆σi ∩ ∆σi+1 requires
the same condition, but only for the co-ordinate that they differ in, and therefore p ∈ ∩ni=1∆σi .
Since we know Lemma 12 holds when the two σs differ in at most one co-ordinate, it now follows
that Rev and ∇Rev at p are the same for all σis and hence for σ and σ′ as well.
Now we prove Lemma 12 when σ and σ′ differ at exactly one co-ordinate, i∗. We consider
the portions of the paths Pσ(i) and Pσ′(i) that are disjoint, and refer to these disjoint portions as
simply P ⊆ Pσ(i) and P ′ ⊆ Pσ′(i). Both of these paths start at i∗ and end at iˆ. Note that once
the two paths merge, they remain the same for the rest of the way. If the paths don’t merge, then
we let iˆ = 0. The critical fact we use is that along these paths the Ds are all the same, which is
stated as the following lemma.
Claim 1. All j, j′ ∈ P ∪ P ′ s.t. j > j′ have the same Dj,j′.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction, where we add one node at a time in the following order.
We start the base case with i∗, σ(i∗) and σ′(i∗). At any point let j and j′ be the last points on P
and P ′ that we have added so far. In the inductive step, if j > j′, we add σ(j) and otherwise we
add σ′(j′). We stop when all nodes in P ∪ P ′ have been added.
For the base case, let j = σ(i∗) and j′ = σ′(i∗). Without loss of generality, assume that j > j′.
By Lemma 9, we get that Di∗,j′ is between Di∗,j and Dj,j′. Since Di∗,j = Di∗,j′ , from the definition
of i∗, we get Di∗,j = Dj,j′ = Di∗,j′ .
For the inductive step, let j ∈ P and j′ ∈ P ′ be the last points that we have added so far,
and again without loss of generality j > j′. Let v = σ(j). If v = j′ we are done. There are two
cases: v > j′ and v < j′. In the former case, we have Dj,v ≥ Dj,j′ from the definition of v. From
Lemma 9, Dj,j′ must be in between Dj,v and Dv,j′ , therefore Dj,j′ ≥ Dv,j′ . Let i′ ∈ P ′ be the
predecessor of j′, i.e., σ′(i′) = j′. Due to the order in which we added the nodes, it must be that
i′ > j. By definition, Di′,j′ ≥ Di′,v, and by Lemma 9 Di′,j′ must be in between Di′,v and Dv,j′ ,
therefore Dv,j′ ≥ Di′,j′ . By the inductive hypothesis, we have that Di′,j′ = Dj,j′ and hence they
both must be equal to Dv,j′ .
Now consider any i 6= j′ that we have already added. It must be that i < v, and hence Di,j′ must
be in between Di,v and Dv,j′ , but from the argument in the previous paragraph and the inductive
hypothesis, we have that Di,j′ = Dv,j′ , and hence they must be equal to Di,v. This completes the
induction for this case. The latter case of v < j′ is identical.
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Continuing the proof of Lemma 12: To show that Revσs agree on the boundary, consider the
difference Revσ(p)−Revσ′(p). For all i ≤ i∗, or i such that i∗ /∈ Pσ(i), nothing changes, therefore
all those terms cancel out. Moreover, even for i such that i∗ ∈ Pσ(i), the only terms that don’t
cancel out are j ∈ P ∪ P ′. Therefore, we get:
Revσ(p)− Revσ′(p) =
∑
i≥i∗:i∗∈Pσ(i) qi
(∑
j∈P pσ(j)
(
Fi(Dj,σ(j))− Fi(Dσ(j),σ2(j))
)
−∑j∈P ′ pσ′(j) (Fi(Dj,σ′(j))− Fi(Dσ′(j),(σ′)2(j)))
)
,
which is zero by Claim 1.
For the second part of the proof, we’ll show that the gradient of Revσ −Revσ′ is zero. We only
need to consider the partial derivatives w.r.t. pj for j ∈ P ∪ P ′ (modulo some corner cases). Fix a
j ∈ P, and consider the terms in ∂(Revσ −Revσ′)∂pj corresponding to some i ≥ i∗ such that i∗ ∈ Pσ(i),
in the outer summation. Let the path Pσ(i) be such that a ∈ Pσ(i), b = σ(a), j = σ(b), c = σ(j)
and d = σ(c).
i→ . . .→ i∗ → . . .→ a→ b→ j → c→ d→ . . .
Then the terms under consideration are
∂
∂pj
qi (pb (Fi(Da,b)− Fi(Db,j)) + pj (Fi(Db,j)− Fi(Dj,c)) + pc (Fi(Dj,c)− Fi(Dc,d))) =
= qi
(
pb
db − dj fi(Db,j)−
pj
db − dj fi(Db,j) + Fi(Db,j)− Fi(Dj,c)−
pj
dj − dc fi(Dj,c) +
pc
dj − dc fi(Dj,c)
)
= qi (Db,jfi(Db,j)−Dj,cfi(Dj,c) + Fi(Db,j)− Fi(Dj,c)) .
By Claim 1, Db,j = Dj,c, and therefore these terms are zero. The cases when i = i
∗, or i∗ = a, b, j,
or c, d = 0, or j ∈ Pσ′(i) are identical.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section, which is simply arguing how this
agreement of gradients implies that Rev is concave everywhere.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider any two prices p1 and p2, and the line segment joining the two. We
will argue that Rev is concave along this line segment, which then implies the Theorem. From
Lemmas 10 and 11, we have that this line segment is itself divided into many intervals, and within
each interval, Rev is a concave function. Further, from Lemma 12, we have that these concave
functions agree at the intersections of the intervals, and the gradients agree too. Thus Rev is
smooth, and the derivative along this line is monotone. This implies that Rev is concave along the
line.
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A Deferred Proofs
The proof below contains the calculations for Example 2.
Proof. We first show that the constant elasticity distribution with cumulative density F (v) =
1− (v/a)1/ǫ is DMR. Recall that DMR is equivalent to concavity of the revenue function. To verify
concavity, we calculate the second derivate of the revenue function and show that it is negative.
R′(v) = (
v
a
)1/ǫ +
v
aǫ
(
v
a
)1/ǫ−1.
R′′(v) = (
v
a
)1/ǫ−1
2
aǫ
+ (
v
a
)1/ǫ−2
v
a2ǫ
(1/ǫ − 1)
= (
v
a
)1/ǫ−2(
2v
a2ǫ
+
v
a2ǫ
(1/ǫ− 1))
= (
v
a
)1/ǫ−2
v
a2ǫ
(1 + 1/ǫ) ≤ 0.
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Now consider regularity. Note that the probability density function f(v) = −1ǫa (v/a)
1/ǫ−1. Recall
that a distribution is regular if the function φ(v) is monotone non-decreasing in v.
φ(v) = v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
= v − (v/a)
1/ǫ
−1
aǫ (v/a)
1/ǫ−1
= v − v/a−1/(aǫ) = v(1 + ǫ),
which is monotone decreasing since by assumption ǫ < −1.
We finally argue that the exponential distribution, defined as F (v) = 1 − e−v is not DMR but
is regular. The revenue function is R(v) = ve−v , its first derivative is R′(v) = (1 − v)e−v , and
its second derivative is (v − 2)e−v , which is positive for v ≥ 2, violating concavity. However, as
commonly known, this distribution is regular since φ(v) = v− 1−F (v)f(v) = v− e
−v
e−v = v−1 is monotone
non-decreasing in v.
Lemma 1. For every EIC and EIR mechanism, there exists an EIC and ex-post IR mechanism
with the same expected payment for any type.
Proof. Consider an EIC and EIR mechanism. First note that we can assume that for each type
(v, d), the randomized allocation A(v, d) does not assign a number of units more than d. If this
is not true, replace any assignment of more than d units with the assignment of d units. Note
that this change does not change the utility of truthful reporting, and cannot improve utility of
non-truthful reporting. Therefore the resulting mechanism is EIC and EIR. Now consider a type
(v, d), its realized allocation A(v, d), and its expected payment p(v, d), and construct a randomized
payment p˜(v, d) as follows
p˜(v, d) =
p(v, d)A(v, d)
E [A(v, d)]
.
Note that the expected payment of the type stays the same,
E [p˜(v, d)] = p(v, d)
E [A(v, d)]
E [A(v, d)]
= p(v, d).
As a result, the modified mechanism stays EIC. In addition, the ex-post utility of the type from
the realized allocation of A(v, d) units is
vA(v, d) − p(v, d)A(v, d)
E [A(v, d)]
,
which is non-negative if and only if
v E [A(v, d)] − p(v, d) ≥ 0,
which hold by EIR.
Lemma 2. For every feasible Bayesian mechanism, there exists another mechanism, with revenue
at least as large, such that A(v, d) is supported on {0, d}.
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Proof. Let xim = P[A(ti) ≥ m] denote the probability that type ti is allocated m or more units. Let
hi be such that x
i
hi
> 0 and xihi+1 = 0. Set w (ti) =
∑hi
m=1 x
i
m
di
, and consider an alternate allocation
given by a random variable B(ti) which is di with probability w(ti) and is 0 otherwise. Then,
P[B(ti) ≥ m] = yim = w (ti) for all m ≤ di. The utility of ti when reporting ti remains unchanged
under this alternate allocation:
u (ti → ti) = vi
di∑
m=1
xim − p (ti) = vidiw (ti)− p (ti) = vi
di∑
m=1
yim − p (ti)
and so does u (tj → ti) for all tj with dj ≥ di. When dj < di, it is easy to check that
∑dj
m=1 x
i
m ≤∑dj
m=1 y
i
m = djw (ti), since x
i
m ≥ xim+1 for all k, and thus the utility of tj when reporting ti can only
decrease. Thus, when changing the allocation from A to B, the EIC constraints are still satisfied,
and total revenue remains unchanged.
Lemma 3. u
(
v, di → v didj , dj
)
= u
(
v didj , dj → v
di
dj
, dj
)
for j > i, and
u (v, di → v, dj) = u (v, dj → v, dj) for j < i.
Proof. u(v, di → v di
dj
, dj) = vdiw(v
di
dj
, dj)− p(v di
dj
, dj)
= (v
di
dj
)djw(v
di
dj
, dj)− p(v di
dj
, dj) = u(v
di
dj
, dj → v di
dj
, dj) = djUdj (v
di
dj
).
The second part is identical.
A mechanism satisfying the following conditions is EIC: ∀di and ∀v,
1. wdi is monotone non-decreasing, and p(v, di) is given by Equation (1).
2. u (v, di+1 → v, di+1) ≥ u (v, di+1 → v, di)
3. u (v, di → v, di) ≥ u
(
v, di → v didi+1 , di+1
)
Proof. We will show that for all pairs of types ti = (vi, di) and tj = (vj , dj), with di ≥ dj + 1, ti
does not want to report tj and vice versa:
• u (ti → ti) ≥ u (vi, di → vi, di − 1) = u (vi, di − 1→ vi, di − 1)
≥ u (vi, di − 1→ vi, di − 2) = u (vi, di − 2→ vi, di − 2)
. . .
≥ u (vi, dj → vi, dj) ≥ u (vi, dj → vj , dj) = u (vi, di → vj, dj) = u (ti → tj)
• u (tj → tj) ≥ u
(
tj → vj djdj+1 , dj + 1
)
= vjdjw
(
vj
dj
dj+1
, dj + 1
)
− p
(
vj
dj
dj+1
, dj + 1
)
= vj
dj
dj+1
(dj + 1)w
(
vj
dj
dj+1
, dj + 1
)
− p
(
vj
dj
dj+1
, dj + 1
)
= u
(
vj
dj
dj+1
, dj + 1→ vj djdj+1 , dj + 1
)
Applying this argument repeatedly gives us: u (tj → tj) ≥ u
(
vj
dj
di
, di → vj djdi , di
)
. Using
truthfulness for a fixed d, we have that the RHS is at least u
(
vj
dj
di
, di → vi, di
)
= vj
dj
di
diw
(
vj
dj
di
, di
)
−
p
(
vj
dj
di
, di
)
, which is just u (tj → ti).
22
B Detailed Characterization for k = 2
We first complete the case analysis that shows that the optimal mechanism is deterministic for
k = 2.
We have the following cases for v1 and v2:
v1 ≤ v2: Thus, for all v ≤ v1 ≤ v2, we have that Ud1(v) = d2d1Ud2
(
v d1d2
)
= Ud1
(
v d1d2
)
, which
implies that Ud1(v) = 0, and therefore Ud2(v) = 0. For all v ≥ v1, we have that U ′d1(v) = 1,
i.e. wd1 (v) = 1; this corresponds to a posted price of d1v1 for a bundle of d1 units. For
v ∈ [v1, v2], we have Ud2(v) = d1d2Ud1(v) = d1d2 (v−v1). This implies that the allocation function
wd2 (v) is equal to
d1
d2
; for a price of d1v1, we offer a bundle of d2 units with probability
d1
d2
.
For v ≥ v2, we have a posted price of d2v2 − (v2 − v1)d1 for a bundle of d2 units. The same
allocation rule can be induced by just two menu units (and no randomization): d1 units cost
v1d1 and d2 units cost v2d2 − (v2 − v1)d1.
v2 ≤ v1 and v1d1 ≤ v2d2: As before, for all v ≤ v2, Ud2(v) = Ud1(v) = 0, and the bundle of d2 units
has a posted price of v2d2. For v ∈ [v2, v1], we have Ud1(v) = d2d1Ud2
(
v d1d2
)
≤ d2d1Ud2 (v2) = 0.
For v ≥ v1, U ′d1(v) = 1; this is a posted price of d1v1 for d1 units.
v2 ≤ v1 and v1d1 > v2d2: Once again, for all v ≤ v2, Ud2(v) = Ud1(v) = 0, and the bundle of
d2 units has a posted price of d2v2. For v ∈
[
v2,
d2
d1
v2
]
, we have Ud1(v) =
d2
d1
Ud2
(
v d1d2
)
= 0.
For v ∈
[
d2
d1
v2, v1
]
, U ′d1(v) = 1; offer a bundle of d1 units for a price of d1
d2
d1
v2 = d2v2. This
corresponds to selling only the d2 bundle for a price of v2d2.
We now characterize the optimal thresholds v1 and v2. Let v1 and v2 be the values after
which (., d1) and (., d2) type agents are allocated d1 and d2 units respectively. Then, the optimal
mechanism posts a price for d1 units and a price for d2 units that is either: (1) v1d1 and v2d2 −
(v2 − v1)d1, (2) v1d1 and v2d2, or (3) v2d2 for both. This is equivalent to the maximum of:
• max v1d1 (2− F1(v1)− F2(v1)) + v2(d2 − d1) (1− F2(v2))
subject to v2 ≥ v1.
• max v1d1 (1− F1(v1)) + v2d2 (1− F2(v2))
subject to v1 ≥ v2 and v1 ≤ d2d1 v2.
• max v2d2
(
2− F2(v2)− F1(v2 d2d1 )
)
.
Let v∗1 and v
∗
2 be the optimal choices for v1 and v2. Also, let vˆ1 and vˆ2 be the monopoly pricing
solutions, i.e. vˆi = argmax vdi (1− Fi(v)).
Then, we have the following options for v∗1 and v
∗
2 :
1. v∗1 = vˆ1 and v
∗
2 = vˆ2 (unconstrained version of the second bullet)
2. v∗1 = argmax vd1 (2− F1(v)− F2(v)) and v∗2 = vˆ2 (unconstrained version of the first bullet)
3. v∗1 = v
∗
2 = argmax v (d1(1− F1(v)) + d2(1− F2(v)))
4. d1d2 v
∗
1 = v
∗
2 = argmax vd2
(
2− F2(v)− F1(v d2d1 )
)
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This corresponds to the following: compute vˆ1 and vˆ2. If
d2
d1
vˆ2 ≥ vˆ1 ≥ vˆ2 we’re done. Otherwise,
compute argmax vd1 (2− F1(v)− F2(v)). If it is at most vˆ2, then pick the best option out of 2,3
and 4. If not, pick the best out of 3 and 4.
• max v1d1 (2− F1(v1)− F2(v1)) + v2(d2 − d1) (1− F2(v2))
subject to v2 ≥ v1.
• max v1d1 (1− F1(v1)) + v2d2 (1− F2(v2))
subject to v1 ≥ v2 and v1 ≤ d2d1 v2.
• max v2d2
(
2− F2(v2)− F1(v2 d2d1 )
)
Let v∗1 and v
∗
2 be the optimal choices for v1 and v2. Also, let vˆ1 and vˆ2 be the monopoly pricing
solutions, i.e. vˆi = argmax vdi (1− Fi(v)). The following procedure gives the optimal v∗1 and v∗2 :
compute vˆ1 and vˆ2, and check whether they satisfy the IC constraints. If they do, then we are
done. If they do not, it must be that either vˆ1 < vˆ2, or vˆ1 >
d2
d1
vˆ2.
In the former case, compute the best per unit price q, i.e. a price q such that d1 units cost qd1
and d2 units cost qd2. This corresponds to the solution of the first bullet.
In the latter case, compute the best bundle price, i.e. the best price p that is going to be the
same for d1 and d2. This corresponds to the solution of the third bullet. The best of p and q the
two is optimal, and given that, v∗1 and v
∗
2 can be easily calculated.
Then, we have the following options for v∗1 and v
∗
2 :
1. v∗1 = vˆ1 and v
∗
2 = vˆ2 (unconstrained version of the second bullet)
2. v∗1 = argmax vd1 (2− F1(v)− F2(v)) and v∗2 = vˆ2 (unconstrained version of the first bullet)
3. v∗1 = v
∗
2 = argmax v (d1(1− F1(v)) + d2(1− F2(v)))
4. d1d2 v
∗
1 = v
∗
2 = argmax vd2
(
2− F2(v)− F1(v d2d1 )
)
This corresponds to the following: compute vˆ1 and vˆ2. If
d2
d1
vˆ2 ≥ vˆ1 ≥ vˆ2 we’re done. Otherwise,
compute argmax vd1 (2− F1(v)− F2(v)). If it is at most vˆ2, then pick the best option out of 2,3
and 4. If not, pick the best out of 3 and 4.
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